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As set out in the preceding sections of this Symposium, the Virginia
capital scheme fails in many ways to protect adequately the rights of capital
defendants. This portion of the compilation distills specific appropriate
remedies to the Virginia courts and General Assembly.
At the outset, it is imperative to recognize that the United States
Supreme Court has explicitly held that the imposition of the death penalty
by the state does not, per se, violate the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.1 Furthermore, this view of capital punishment is not
likely to change despite the arguably arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty.2 The death penalty as administered thus becomes the focus of
analysis. This article considers the various ways the capital scheme in
Virginia may be altered to eliminate the present ambiguities and contradic-
tions.
The problems associated with the imposition of the death penalty have
been the subject of much research. Many high-profile participants in the
judicial system, those who come in direct contact with capital murder trials
and appeals, view the manner in which the death penalty is imposed as
"arbitrary and capricious."3 On February 3, 1998, the American Bar Associ
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
Bucknell University.
1. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (concluding that "the infliction of
death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitution-
ally severe"). The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of 'cruel and unusual"
punishment by the state. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99, 305-06 (1987) (concluding that
statistical evidence displaying a disparity in the imposition of capital punishment due to the
race of the victim and race of the defendant is insufficient to show either a denial of equal
protection or the violation of the Eighth Amendment).
3. See Stephen B. Bright, Deatb PenaltyMoratorium: Fairness, Integrity at Stake, CRIM.
JUST., Summer 1998, at 28, 29-30 (citing former United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis
Powell, United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, and United States Court of
Appeals Judge Gerald W. Heaney as judges who have publicly voiced their concerns about
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ation ("ABA") issued a controversial resolution calling for a moratorium on
executions in the United States.! The number of individuals exonerated and
released from death rows across the country, in large part due to the advent
of sophisticated DNA profiling, sends a disturbing message: not only is the
American justice system imposing the death penalty in a random fashion,
but individuals facing death sentences may actually lack the requisite culpa-
bility.' Two factors have been highly publicized as causing these problems:
first, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel as inapplicable to discretionary appeals;6 and second,
capital defense representation at the trial level is notoriously inadequate.7
While these problems are national in scope, they do not necessarily preclude
adequate representation in Virginia. The Virginia defense bar is composed
of many attorneys who have dedicated their professional careers to provid-
ing indigent defendants with competent representation and who work
the consistency with which capital punishment is imposed).
4. See James Podgers, Time Out For Executions, 83 A.B.A.J., April 1997, at 26. While
the ABA's official position on the death penalty is one of neutrality, the resolution identified
the following four problem areas with the imposition of capital punishment today: (1) the
apparent inability of capital defense procedure to preserve the defendants' due process rights;
(2)the lack of competent legal counsel for capital defendants at each stage of the criminal
process, including conviction, sentencing, and appeals; (3) the racially discriminatory
imposition of the death penalty; and (4) the "unconscionable" executions of juvenile offenders
and the mentally retarded. Kara Thompson, TheABA 's Resolution Calling ForA Moratorium
on Executions: What Jurisdictions Can Do To Ensure That The Death Penalty Is Imposed
Responsibly, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1515 (1998) (citing Podgers, supra this note).
5. Stephen Bright, Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta,
summarizes the recent events as follows:
At least 70 people sentenced to death in the United States in the last 20 years have
been found iniocent and released from death rows. Others have had their death
sentences commuted to life imprisonment because of doubts about their guilt,
and some have been executed despite questions of innocence. In Illinois, more
people have been released from death row than have been executed.
Bright, supra note 3, at 30.
6. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,618-19 (1974) (holding that an indigent defendant
is not entitled to the appointment of counsel for the purpose of bringing discretionary
appeals); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (holding that states are not required to
provide counsel to indigent death row prisoners seeking state post-conviction relief; "mean-
ingful access" to the courts can be satisfied in various ways by the states).
7. Bright, supra note 3, at 30. The following are examples: (1) failure of trial counsel
to adequately prepare mitigating evidence for the sentencing phase of a capital trial; (2) court
appointment of inexperienced counsel; and, perhaps most offensively, (3) the "ability" of trial
counsel to actually sleep during a capital trial. Id. at 29-30. See McFarland v. Texas, 928
S.W.2d 482,501-03,505-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that, where defense counsel failed
to question any witnesses, failed to visit the crime scene, and fell asleep during trial, ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel was not established), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997); Ex parte
Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (denial of certiorari despite the trial court's
finding that defense counsel fell asleep while the prosecution was questioning witnesses and
presenting evidence).
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creatively and diligently to do so. In addition, Virginia has been relatively
fair with respect to providing capital defense counsel with compensation for
their services; that compensation is far better than that provided for the
defense of other felonies and may even be considered adequate.
Unfortunately, representing capital defendants remains difficult under
the Virginia capital scheme; for example: (1) the Commonwealth is permit-
ted to lie to and intentionally mislead defense counsel;' (2) a capital defen-
dant is denied a bill of particulars sufficient to notify him of the aggravating
factor(s) to be relied upon at sentencing;9 (3) the Commonwealth is permit-
ted to withhold relevant evidence from the defense; 0 (4) the defense may be
8. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996). In Gray, the Commonwealth
deliberately misled defense counsel with respect to the evidence it intended to present in the
sentencing phase. The Commonwealth notified defense counsel that, in the event Gray was
found guilty of capital murder, it intended to introduce evidence that Gray had committed
a double-murder several months before, for which Gray was never charged. Originally, the
Commonwealth told defense counsel that it intended to offer only Gray's admissions to his
codefendant and other inmates that he committed these murders. However, the evening after
the jury returned a guilty verdict, the Commonwealth informed defense counsel that it
would offer additional evidence, including photographs of the crime scene as well as the
testimony of the police detective who investigated the murders and the state medical exam-
iner who performed the victims' autopsies. Defense counsel objected to the admission of this
additional evidence first thing the following morning. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Gray asserted that because the Commonwealth gave him inadequate notice
of the evidence it intended to introduce and that the Commonwealth intentionally misled
him with respect to this evidence, his due process rights were violated. The Court remanded
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for a determination as to
whether Gray effectively preserved his "prosecution misrepresentation" claim. Id. at 156-57.
Gray's claim, succinctly phrased in his petition for certiorari, appears in the Fourth
Circuit's opinion but is substantively ignored. The court held that, despite the opportunity
to do so, defense counsel failed to adequately preserve the claim for federal habeas review.
Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d 158, 164 (4th Cir. 1996).
9. The purpose of the bill of particulars is to provide the defendant with sufficient
facts regarding the crime to adequately inform an accused in advance of the offense for which
he is to be tried. See Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1998). Where the
indictment provides the defendant with adequate notice of the nature and character of the
offense charged, a bill of particulars is not required to provide notice of the aggravating
factors the Commonwealth intends to use. See generally Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 402
S.E.2d 218, 223-24 (Va. 1991).
10. See Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999); Ashley Flynn, Case Note, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 165 (1999) (analyzing Strickler, 119 S. Ct. 1936). Strickler was convicted of capital
murder, in large part due to the testimony of eye-witness Anne Stoltzfus. In her initial
conversations with the police, Stoltzfus was unsure as to what events she had actually
witnessed. Over time, her memory miraculously cleared and she was able to identify
Strickler, because of her "exceptionally good memory." Defense counsel was unaware of
Stoltzfus's original interviews with the police and did not have access to the Stoltzfus
materials (which were located in the police file), despite the Commonwealth's open file
policy. Defense counsel raised a Brady claim based upon this information in federal district
court. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1944-47.
The Fourth Circuit determined the Brady claim to be procedurally defaulted because
"reasonably competent counsel would have sought discovery in state court of the police files,
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barred from presenting relevant evidence at sentencing; "t and (5) the future
dangerousness agravator has not been modified to fit into the life-without-
parole context.'" In addition, Virginia's twenty-one day rule severely
restricts a convicted defendant's ability to reopen his case to introduce
exculpatory DNA evidence or other evidence of actual innocence.13
In this article, the major problem areas in the Virginia capital murder
statutory blueprint will be discussed in the following order: (1) the predicate
felonies and their expansion over time; (2) the aggravating factors, future
dangerousness and vileness; (3) the admissibility of victim impact evidence;
(4) the proportionality review statutory provision; and (5) the twenty-one
day bar on newly discovered evidence. In the discussion of each, suggestions
and that in response to this simple request, it is likely the state court would have ordered the
production of the files.* Id. at 1947 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The United States Supreme Court disagreed as to this point but affirmed the conviction,
deciding that Strickler had failed to demonstrate a "reasonable probability that the jury
would have returned a different verdict if (Stotzfus's] testimony had been either severely
impeached or excluded entirely." Id. at 1955.
See also Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999). The facts in Cherrix are
somewhat unusual but are nonetheless illustrative of the Commonwealth's ability to with-
hold exculpatory evidence from the defense. Cherrix's grandmother testified as an alibi
witness for him at trial. The Commonwealth introduced a written statement, signed by
Cherrix's grandmother, containing essentially the same information as her trial testimony,
albeit with a fifteen-minute time discrepancy. Presumably, the statement was offered to
impeach Cherrix's grandmother. The defense objected to the admission of the statement
since it contained exculpatory information that had not been disclosed by the Common-
wealth, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Cherrix argued on appeal that,
despite the defense counsel's knowledge of the general exculpatory material contained in the
statement, the admission of the statement demonstrated the Commonwealth's lack of good
faith and violated the due process clause. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
argument, noting that the statement would not have been material exculpatory evidence, as
required by Brady. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 649 (basing finding of immateriality upon defense
counsel's knowledge of Cherrix's grandmother's availability as an alibi witness).
Strickler and Cherrix illustrate the slippery slope employed by the Virginia courts when
evaluating a Brady claim. The Commonwealth's duty to disclose has slowly become defense
counsel's duty to discover. The Cherrix court overlooked an important point, relevant to
many capital Brady issues-that is, a capital defendant may be uncooperative and unwilling to
provide any information, much less exculpatory information, to his trial counsel.
11. SeeJason J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues andAnalysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55
1999) (Part I this Symposium); see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 572-73
(Va. 1999) (unequivocally stating that prior unadjudicated conduct (1) is relevant to a finding
of future dangerousness and (2) need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Cherrix, 513
S.E.2d 653 & n.4 (affirming trial court's refusal to admit expert testimony regarding general
prison conditions).
12. In 1995 parole was abolished in Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie
1999). Thus, the future dangerousness inquiry requires only a consideration of the capital
defendant's future danger to prison society.
13. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:15(b) (limiting motions to set aside verdict to the first
twenty-one days after entry of the final order). Note that a court may only grant a new trial
in the wake of a successful motion to set aside the verdict.
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will be made as to what changes should be fashioned to improve the capital
system in Virginia.
IL Predicate Felonies in the Capital Context
Two observations may be made with respect to the judicial application
of section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code.1" First, the Virginia courts seem to
have stretched the requirements of rape and robbery in order to sustain
capital convictions based on these predicate felonies." Second, courts appear
to have manipulated the requisite proof of sex offenses which are capital
murder predicates. 6
Inconsistencies in the law have resulted. Perhaps the most illustrative
example is the disparate treatment of the asportation element of larceny in
the capital and non-capital context. In Welch v. Commonwealth," the
Virginia Court of Appeals sustained the larceny conviction of a defendant
who was apprehended with a shopping cart full of televisions while still on
the store's premises. The court held that "[wj]here there is evidence that an
individual has acted in a manner that is inconsistent with that of a prospec-
tive purchaser, and has exercised immediate dominion and control over the
property, despite his continued presence within the owner's store, such conduct
establishes sufficient possession to satisfy [the asportation] element of
larceny." 8 In marked contrast, the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld a
capital murder conviction on a theory of "continuing asportation" in Tross
v. Commonwealth.9 Tross entered a convenience store, removed some beer
from a cooler and placed it in his pocket. On his way out of the store, he
encountered the store manager and shot him. The Virginia Court of Ap-
peals declined to accept Tross's theory that, because the asportation element
was completed at the time of the murder, the taking was a larceny, not a
robbery. The court held, instead, that "appellant's asportation of the beer
continued until he shot the store manager in the face and took beer from the
manager's dominion and control."0
The willingness of the courts to stretch the elements of predicate
felonies also results in unfortunate, perhaps unintended, circumstances; the
14. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie 1999) (defining capital offenses in Virginia).
15. See Heather L. Necklaus, Predicate Felonies in the Context of Capital Cases, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 37 (1999) (Part I[ this Symposium).
16. Id.
17. 425 S.E.2d 101 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
18. Welch v. Commonwealth, 425 S.E.2d 101, 105 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis
added).
19. 464 S.E.2d 523, 534 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (although capitally-convicted, Tross
received a life sentence).
20. Tross v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 523,534 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
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best example of this phenomenon is found among the sex offenses.21 In
Tuggle v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld a capital
murder conviction based on the rape predicate, although there was no
evidence of penile penetration of the victim's vagina.2" The court held that
evidence of penetration by "something," in light of semen found in the
victim's anus, was sufficient to satisfy the penal penetration element of
rape.
24
Similarly, with respect to the underlying offense of object sexual
penetration ("OSP"), also encompassed by subsection five of the capital
murder statute, the distinction between attempted and completed offenses
is blurred, if not abolished. Homicide in the commission of attempted OSP
is not a crime punishable by death in the state of Virginia." Several non-
capital cases have addressed the underlying offense of OSP; these cases
illustrate the vanishing line between attempted and completed offenses.
Roger Lee Jett was convicted of OSP and appealed to the Virginia
Court of Appeals; he argued that the evidence presented at trial was insuffi-
cient to prove the actual penetration required by statute.26 Evidence offered
by the Commonwealth included the victim's testimony that Jett had, on
multiple occasions, instructed her to rub a hairbrush or doll on the outside
of her vagina.' In addition, the victim's mother testified that the victim's
clitoris was red and swolen.28 The court of appeals noted that there was a
"reasonable inference that penetration had occurred" and affirmed the
conviction.
29
James Matthew Marshall appealed his conviction for attempted OSP to
the court of appeals, arguing that the evidence offered at trial failed to
exclude the possibility that the victim's injuries were incurred during
21. See Necklaus, supra Part II this Symposium.
22. 323 S.E.2d 539 (Va. 1984).
23. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 539,549-50 (Va. 1984). The court noted that,
in order to prove the predicate offense of rape, the Commonwealth "must prove that there
has been an actual penetration to some extent of the male sexual organ into the female sexual
organ." Id. (quoting McCall v. Commonwealth, 65 S.E.2d 540, 542 (Va. 1951)).
24. Id. at 550.
25. Subsection five of the Virginia Code defines the following as capital murder: "The
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of, or subse-
quent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object
sexual penetration. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(5) (Michie 1999).
26. Jett v. Commonwealth, 501 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Va. Ct. App. 1998). See VA. CODE
ANN. S 18.2-67.2 (Michie 1999) (reading in relevant part: "An accused shall be guilty of(OSP]
if he or she penetrates the labia majora or anus of a complaining witness. .. .") (emphasis
added).
27. Jett, 501 S.E.2d at 458.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
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medical treatment." The court held that because the anal injuries to the
victim were of the same age as injuries sustained from a punch to the stom-
ach, to which Marshall confessed, the jury's finding of attempted OSP was
reasonable." After Jett's and Marshall's cases, there is no apparent distinc-
tion between OSP and attempted OSP.
These cases illustrate the ease with which Virginia courts have lessened
proof requirements, thus blurring the original distinction between different
offenses-OSP and attempted OSP. Put simply, the decision in Jett relaxed
the proof sufficient to prove penetration for the purpose of OSP. Although
Jett was a non-capital case, the Commonwealth will certainly rely upon the
expansive rationale in capital cases. To that extent, what is now first degree
felony murder will become capital murder. Contrary to intuition, it is clear
from Tuggle that the courts are not exercising more care in the capital
context.
With sex offenses in particular, it is imperative that members of the
judicial system remember that no matter how horrible, distasteful, hateful
or atrocious a killing may be, it is not a crime punishable by the death
penalty unless the General Assembly identifies it as such under section 18.2-
31 of the Virginia Code. For example, at the time Tuggle was decided,32
forcible sodomy was not a predicate for capital murder. It is fair to read
that case as permitting clear evidence of anal sodomy to prove rape in order
to preserve a capital conviction and death sentence. The court's willingness
to loosen the requirements necessary to sentence a defendant to death
amounts to both judicial legislation and judicial activism.
This problem cannot be addressed by amending the capital murder
statute. It must come from within the judicial branch itself; in order to do
so, judges must conservatively define offenses and their corollary proof
requirements.
II. Predicate Expansion
As noted above, the General Assembly alone is charged with the
responsibility of defining capital murder. Unfortunately, two problems
emerge: first, judicial interpretation may have gone beyond the intent of the
General Assembly when it enacted the specific language found in section
18.2-31; and second, the General Assembly appears to have overlooked, or
ignored, the expansive nature of parts of the statute.
30. Marshall v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 120, 123-24 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
31. Id. at 124.
32. It was subsequent to the Tuggle decision that the General Assembly amended
subsection five of the capital murder statute to cover the killing in the commission of forcible
sodomy scenario.
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With respect to the General Assembly's intent, the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Payne v. Commonwealtb3  held that a capital defendant may
receive more than one death sentence per victim.' In so doing, the court
examined legislative intent after conducting an analysis under Blockburger
v. United States." The court concluded that it was "clear" as well as "logical"
that the General Assembly intended "for each statutory offense to be
punished separately as a Class 1 felony."36 The perhaps unintended result
of this holding is that a capital defendant may receive, for example, two
death sentences for a violation of a single subsection of 18.2-31. This was
the result in Payne, in which the death sentences were affirmed on the basis
that the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing in the commission of
rape and the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing in the commission
of OSP are two distinct crimes found within the same subsection of the
capital murder statute. The court found that each violation of subsection
five was sufficiently independent to subject Payne to the death penalty. 7
The General Assembly is urged to address this decision and clarify the
legislature's intent with respect to multiple death sentences.
Andre L. Graham was convicted of capital murder as part of the same
act or transaction, in violation of section 18.2-31(7) of the Virginia Code."
Graham, pointing to the triggerman statute as a defense,39 argued that the
Commonwealth was required to prove that he was the immediate perpetra-
tor in both killings in order to sustain a conviction under subsection seven.'
The court, citing the principle of gradation, interpreted the language of
subsection seven to define an offense "qualitatively more egregious than an
isolated act of premeditated murder."4 The court explained that the Gen-
eral Assembly did this by "add[ing]... a gradation crime to the single act of
premeditated murder." 2 As a result, a conviction under subsection seven
only requires proof that the defendant was the triggerman in the principal
33. 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999).
34. Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293, 301 (Va. 1999).
35. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding that in order to determine whether two acts or
transactions are separate offenses, "the test to be applied ... is whether each [statutory]
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not").
36. Payne, 509 S.E.2d at 301 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
37. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(5) (Michie 1999).
38. Graham v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 128, 128 (Va. 1995); see VA. CODE ANN.
18.2-31(7) (Michie 1999).
39. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie 1999); see also Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257
S.E.2d 797,806-07 (Va. 1979) (holding that only the immediate perpetrator of a homicide may
be convicted of capital murder).
40. Graham, 464 S.E.2d at 129-30.
41. Id. at 130.
42. Id.
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murder charged and was at least an accomplice in the second murder. 3 This
rationale can likely be extended to subsection eight, the willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing of more than one person within a three year
period." The General Assembly should address whether these subsections
were indeed designed to trump the policy embodied within the triggerman
statute.
In other areas, the General Assembly itself has created ambiguities in
the capital murder statute. Two areas are particularly troublesome. First,
the ballooning definition of "law enforcement officer,"referenced in subsec-
tion six, has effectively created numerous new and different forms of capital
murder. Second, the curious overlap between subsections seven (same act
or transaction murder) and eight (serial murder) serves to confuse attorneys
and judges alike.
Over the years, expansion through incorporation by reference has
broadened the definition of a "law enforcement officer.""5 Originally, the
term was defined as a full-time employee of a police department or sheriff's
office, responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the en-
forcement of penal, traffic, or highway laws of the State.' Over the years,
the definition has expanded so that it now includes railroad police and state
lottery officials. While all of these augmentations have been sanctioned by
the General Assembly, it seems doubtful that the legislature has examined
the purpose behind subsection six of the capital murder statute each time it
has expanded its scope by amending section 9-169(9) of the Virginia Code,
which defines the term "law enforcement officer."47 Section 9-169(9) is
found in Title 9, the portion of the Code covering "Commissions, Boards
and Institutions Generally." The textual context of the section certainly
does not suggest its application to the capital murder statute. It is quite
possible that, when amending section 9-169(9), the General Assembly has
overlooked the purpose behind the adoption of the original subsection
six-that is, to subject those who kill law enforcement officers in the line of
duty to the death penalty or, more specifically, to prevent killings in the
midst of a suspected criminal's apprehension.
Furthermore, one key element of capital murder (as with most crimes)
is that the defendant be on notice as to the general severity of the conse-
quences his actions may carry. While it may be plainly obvious that killing
a police officer who is in pursuit of the defendant will carry a harsh penalty,
43. Id.
44. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(8) (Michie 1999).
45. See generally Hammad S. Matin, Expansion of Section 18.2.31 of the Virginia Code,
12 CAP. DEF. J. 7 (1999) (Part I this Symposium).
46. VA. CODE ANN. S 9-108 (Michie 1973); see also Matin, Part I this Symposium.
47. VA. CODE ANN. S 9-169(9) (Michie 1999).
48. See generally Matin, supra Part I this Symposium.
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it may be less apparent that, for example, killing a state lottery official may
result in the state's ultimate censure. The General Assembly should exam-
ine the current definition of "law enforcement officer" and specifically
address whether the killings of all the persons listed therein should be
punishable by death and justify their inclusion into this class.
The second point of concern in this area concerns the conspicuous
overlap between subsections seven and eight of section 18.2-3 1." It would
appear that all murders that are part of the same act or transaction are
necessarily committed within the requisite three-year time frame which
limits the application of subsection eight. If the General Assembly intended
to abolish same act or transaction capital murder with the adoption of the
serial murder provision, it needs to affirmatively say so. If, on the other
hand, the General Assembly intended for the two subsections to coexist, it
should specify which acts are covered under each of the two subsections.
IV The Aggravators
In Virginia, one of two aggravating factors must be found by the fact-
finder before a defendant who has been convicted of capital murder may be
sentenced to death.' The jury must be unanimous in finding one or both
of the two aggravators, future dangerousness and vileness."1
A. Vileness
A finding of vileness may only be based on three "sub-elements": 2
depravity of mind, torture, or aggravated battery. 3 The Commonwealth
has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of vile-
ness. There is new authority supporting the proposition that the Common-
wealth must prove at least one vileness sub-element beyond a reasonable
doubt and that the jury must be unanimous in finding that sub-element.
Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court decided Richardson
v. United States,s' a case interpreting 21 U.S.C. S 848, the section of the
United States Code that defines a "continuing criminal enterprise" (CCE).ss
Like the finding of vileness, the finding of a CCE requires proof of underly-
49. VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.2-31(7) (Michie 1999) (covering "same act or transaction"
multiple killings); 18.2-31(8) (Michie 1999) (covering "serial murder" scenarios).
50. VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-264.2; 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1999).
51. See generally Hoke v. Commonwealth, 377 S.E.2d 595, 602 (Va. 1989).
52. See Douglas R. Banghart, Vdeness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 77 (Part IV
this Symposium) (discussing the term "sub-element" and its application to an analysis of the
vileness aggravator).
53. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).
54. 119 S. Ct. 1707 (1999).
55. Richardson v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1709 (1999).
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mag sub-elements, specifically, a "continuing series of violations."' The
issue in Richardson was whether the jury was required to unanimously find
the existence of each of the individual "violations" sufficient to constitute
a particular "continuing series," or whether the jury was required only to
unanimously find the existence of any continuing series."7 The "continuing
series" at issue in Richardson corresponds to the vileness finding under the
Virginia capital murder statute, in that a continuing series is composed of
individual violations in the same way that a vileness finding is based upon
a finding of any of its three sub-elements-aggravated battery, torture, and
depravity of mind.
.In Richardson, the Supreme Court questioned whether the applicable
statute identified the "means" by which the "element" of a "continuing
series" may be found or whether the statute identified "elements" which
must be found in order to find the "element" of a "continuing series."8
Generally, the jury must unanimously agree as to all elements of a crime,
but not to the means by which the crime was committed. 9 In a relatively
brief and unadorned opinion, the Court found the underlying violations to
be elements of the crime, and thus, the defendant in a 28 U.S.C. S 848 case
is entitled to a unanimousjury finding as to each of the violations compris-
ing a "continuing series. "
The import of a finding of one or more of the vileness sub-elements is
substantively identical. If anything, the vileness case is stronger than in the
CCE instance, in that the jury need only find one of the vileness sub-ele-
ments as opposed to a series of "violations." The Richardson framework is
clearly applicable to Virginia's capital murder statute. Absent a unanimity
requirement with respect to the sub-elements, jurors reach the illogical
conclusion that they have found vileness beyond a reasonable doubt even
though they were unable to agree on the facts that led them to this conclu-
sion.
The Supreme Court of Virginia should revisit the unanimity issue and
require the same standard for agreement regarding the sub-elements of
vileness as the overall finding of vileness demands.
B. Future Dangerousness
Perhaps the most muddled area of capital law in Virginia concerns the
fact-finder's determination of "future dangerousness"-the degree to which
the capital defendant poses a threat to "society" if he is spared a death
56. 21 U.S.C. 5 848(c) (1999).
57. Richardson, 119 S. Ct. at 1709.
58. Id. at 1710.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1713.
61. See Banghart, supra Part IV this Symposium.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
sentence.62  The abolition of parole in 19956 should have affected the
application of this factor in significant ways. In addition, there are funda-
mental problems with the structure of sections 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4 of
the Virginia Code; these statutes confuse the evidence admissible to support
a finding of future dangerousness with that admissible to support a finding
of vileness.'
First, section 19.2-264.2 of the Virginia Code refers to a finding of
future dangerousness predicated upon only "consideration of the past
criminal record of convictions of the defendant" and specifically connects
vileness with "conduct in committing the offense."65 Thus, section 19.2-
264.2 creates a clear dichotomy between future dangerousness supported by
past criminality and vileness supported by current offense conduct.
Subsection C of 19.2-264.4, however, seems to permit a finding of
future dangerousness to be supported by evidence of the defendant's prior
history and/or evidence of the circumstances of the offense. This section
broadens section 19.2-264.2 in two ways: first, it permits a fully retrospec-
tive examination of the defendant's "history" rather than just his prior
convictions; and second, it appears to permit current offense evidence to
support a future dangerousness finding. Section 19.2-264.4(D), which sets
out a verdict form, retains the "history" language of section 19.2-264.4(C)
(and so is broader than section 19.2-264.2), but .deletes current offense
conduct from the evidentiary base (and so is narrower than section 19.2-
264.4(C))." The ambiguity has resulted in several cases in which the circum-
stances of the killing have been used to sentence the defendant to death on
a finding of future dangerousness. 67 The General Assembly needs to clarify
62. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).
63. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999) ('Any person sentenced to a term
of incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall not be
eligible for parole upon that offense."). The life-sentenced capital defendant is not even
eligible for geriatric parole, see VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40 (Michie 1999).
64. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4, 19.264.2 (Michie 1999).
65. S 19.2-264.2.
66. The verdict form reads in relevant part:
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of (here set
out statutory langu ge of the offense charged) and that (after consideration of his
prior history that there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society) or his
conduct in committing the offense is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved (torture) (depravity of mind) (aggravated battery to
the victim) and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense,
unanimously fix his punishment at death.
S 19.2-264.4(D).
67. See, e.g., Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 655 (Va. 1983) (Cheinous
circumstances" surrounding the killing sufficient basis for finding that defendant posed a
continuing serious threat to society); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Va.
1985) (condoning the use of current offense evidence to prove future dangerousness).
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the discrepancy among these statutory provisions. In so doing, a reevalua-
tion of Smith v. Commonwealth68 may be instructive. In Smith, the Supreme
Court of Virginia addressed Smith's argument that the statutory definition
of future dangerousness was unconstitutionally vague. 69 In ruling that the
language was not unconstitutionally vague, the court specifically noted, "In
our view, [the statutory language detailing the future dangerousness predi-
cate"I is designed to focus the fact-finder's attention on prior criminal
conduct as the principal predicate for a prediction of future dangerousness.""'
The General Assembly should also reevaluate the language of subsec-
tion B of 19.2-264.4 in relation to the ambiguity discussed above. Subsection
B instructs the court to hear any evidence that may be relevant to sentenc-
ing."2 In doing so, it identifies some examples of relevant and admissible
evidence: "Evidence which may be admissible ... may include the circum-
stances surrounding the offense, the history and background of the defen-
dant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense.""r The next sentence
provides further examples of mitigating evidence. From both the textual
context and the fact that the statute elsewhere identifies evidence relevant
to the finding of aggravating factors,74 it seems clear that these sentences
address evidence that may be presented by the defendant in mitigation.
However, evidence presented by the Commonwealth to support its case for
death is frequently admitted under this portion of the sentencing
provisions."5
Admission of any unadjudicated acts the capital defendant may have
committed also has a doubtful statutory basis. Under section 19.2-264.2, a
future dangerousness finding is based upon the defendant's prior convic-
tions . 6 Yet subsections C and D of 19.2-264.4 permit the defendant's "prior
history" to support future dangerousness.' Likewise, subsection B of 19.2-
68. 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
69. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (Va. 1978).
70. The language defining the aggravator has remained the same: "[A] probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society.. . ." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).




74. This is done so in the context of defining the aggravating factors. VA. CODE ANN.
S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1999).
75. See, e.g., Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 218, 227 (Va. 1991) (sustaining
both the admission of Quesinberry's drug use and the admission of a photograph of the
victim taken during an autopsy to support the Commonwealth's case for death).
76. 5 19.2-264.2 (after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant.... .") (emphasis added).
77. SS 19.2-264.4(C), (D) (emphasis added).
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264.4 permits the defendant's "prior history" to be introduced as
mitigation." The "prior history" language clearly covers more than prior
convictions and permits the admission of unadjudicated acts."
Thus, in Virginia, the sentencing procedure for capital murder differs
in an important way from the procedure used to sentence other felons:
prior unadjudicated conduct is considered relevant to and admissible in the
capital defendant's sentencing."0 In contrast, past conduct of the defendant
in the felony sentencing context must be a "prior criminal conviction
[proven by] certified, attested or exemplified copies of the record of convic-
tion."8" In addition to satisfying the authentication requirement, the Com-
monwealth must provide a detailed notice of intent to use such prior convic-
tions to the defendant at least fourteen days prior to trial.8 2 Virginia courts
have expressly noted that the purpose of this notice provision is to permit
the defense to investigate the validity of the convictions which the Com-
monwealth seeks to introduce. 3 It is difficult to believe that these concerns
are not heightened when the Commonwealth seeks the death penalty.
Furthermore, in capital cases the Commonwealth must prove the existence
of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. It belies common sense
to allow the Commonwealth to establish future dangerousness beyond a
reasonable doubt without proving beyond a reasonable doubt the prior
conduct on which this finding is premised.84
However, the language of the verdict form instructing the sentencing
jury to consider the "prior history" of the defendant seems to conflict with
the general rule against admission of unadjudicated bad acts. The General
Assembly is urged to explicitly limit the admission of past crimes to those
that have been adjudicated and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
General Assembly believes it necessary that a defendant be accorded the
right to defend himself against erroneous attributions of past criminality in
the non-capital context, it surely must recognize that a capital defendant has
a heightened interest in his defense.
78. S 19-264.4(B).
79. See Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 653 (Va. 1983).
80. See S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1999) (C[Evidence may be presented as to any matter
which the court deems relevant to sentence."); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 342 (Va.
1987); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 422 (Va. 1985).
81. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1999).
82. Id. The notice must include (1) the date of each prior conviction, (2) the name and
jurisdiction of the court issuing each conviction, and (3) a list of each offense of which the
defendant was convicted.
83. See Lebedun v. Commonwealth, 501 S.E.2d 427, 437 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
84. See Robert H. Robinson, Jr., Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 261 (analyzing Orbe v.
Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 1999)).
85. S 19.2-264.4(D).
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The abolition of parole for persons convicted of capital murder in 1995
has dramatically changed the meaning of the future dangerousness aggrava-
tor. Today, the question jurors must address is whether the capital defen-
dant will present a future danger to prison society. Ideally, the statutory
language of the future dangerousness aggravator should be changed to reflect
this limitation. In the meantime, however, Virginia courts must recognize
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Gardner v. Florida6 and its
implications in this context. In Gardner, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that a capital defendant be permitted to introduce any
evidence that rebuts the prosecution's case for death."7 The holding in
Skipper v. South Carolina" is also instructive. In Skipper, the South Carolina
trial court denied Skipper's proffer of evidence at sentencing of his good
behavior during the months he spent in jail awaiting trial.8 9 The United
States Supreme Court remanded for a new sentencing phase, holding that
"a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment
to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature rele-
vant to the sentencing determination."' While Skipper concerned past
prison conduct of the defendant, this rationale is applicable with respect to
evidence offered to testify to a capital defendant's expected conduct while
incarcerated.91
Under the rationales of Gardner and Skipper, a defendant ought to be
permitted to introduce "prison life evidence" to rebut the Commonwealth's
future dangerousness case when the Commonwealth seeks the death penalty
based on the future dangerousness aggravator.92
V Victim Impact Evidence
Section 19.2-11.01 of the Virginia Code93 permits the Commonwealth
to introduce evidence of a homicide's effect on the victim's friends and
family in support of its case for death. This is so whether the case is based
on vileness or future dangerousness. However, sections 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-
86. 512 U.S. 349 (1977).
87. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
88. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
89. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. at 6-7 (noting that any distinction drawn between a defendant's past behavior
in prison and a defendant's future adaptability to prison is "elusive").
92. Prison life evidence encompasses evidence detailing the capital defendant's life in
prison, the likely temperament of the defendant under these circumstances (based on past
evidence or predictions by experts), and any other evidence that could be construed as
helping paint an accurate picture of the defendant in the prison atmosphere for the jury. See
Jason J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (1999) (Part
III this Symposium).
93. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01 (Michie 1999).
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264.4 of the Virginia Code 94 outline the conditions under which a jury may
recommend a death sentence; namely, it may do so only upon a finding of
one or both of the aggravators. The General Assembly has created inconsis-
tent systems by allowing victim impact testimony while limiting the bases
on which a death sentence may be justified to vileness and future dangerous-
ness.
Clearly, victim impact testimony is not relevant to a finding of future
dangerousness, particularly since the abolition of parole for capital defen-
dants ensures that there is no danger that the victim's family will be haunted
by the defendant or by concern of his eventual release."
At first blush, the irrelevance of victim impact evidence is not as clear
in the vileness context. However, vileness must be predicated upon one or
more of the following: aggravated battery, torture, or depravity of mind.
The first two of these concern only the circumstances of the offense."
Certainly, the testimony of a victim's family regarding the loving nature of
the victim is not relevant to the jury's finding that the defendant went above
and beyond what was necessary to kill his victim (as required to establish
aggravated battery). 7 The same is true in the case of torture. Although
the depravity of mind predicate is not necessarily illustrated by the circum-
stances of the offense, its inclusion in the capital murder statute is intended
to allow the jury to take into consideration the defendant's state of mind."
A defendant's mens rea cannot be determined by examining the impact of
the victim's death upon his family."°
The General Assembly is encouraged to address this inconsistency and
affirmatively acknowledge that, under the Virginia capital murder scheme,
victim impact evidence is not relevant to the jury during sentencing. If it
has any relevance at all, it is after the existence of at least one aggravator has
been found beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury has recommended a
death sentence. At this point it is plausible that victim evidence may be
relevant to the trial judge when deciding whether or not to impose the
recommended death sentence. Because the General Assembly has specifi-
cally defined the aggravating factors and identified the evidence upon which
findings of future dangerousness and vileness may be based, there is no
94. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1999).
95. See Solomon, supra Part Ell this Symposium (discussing rationales for admitting
victim impact evidence under the prior statutory scheme).
96. See Banghart, supra Part IV this Symposium.
97. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "aggravated battery" as
the "[u]nlawful application of force to another characterized by unusual or serious conse-
quences or attended circumstances such as a dangerous weapon").
98. See Banghart, supra Part IV this Symposium; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND
THE LAW OF PROOF 1 (1977).
99. See Banghart, supra Part IV this Symposium.
100. See id.
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justification for permitting the Commonwealth to introduce victim impact
evidence to the sentencing jury.
VI. Proportionality Review
The Virginia capital scheme provides for proportionality review of a
death sentence by the Supreme Court of Virginia."0 Section 17.1-313 of the
Virginia Code instructs the court to direct this review to two areas: first,
whether the death sentence was imposed under the influence of an arbitrary
factor such as passion or prejudice; and second, whether the death sentence
is proportionate to the sentence imposed in similar cases "considering both
the crime and the defendant."" 2 Although the statutory language of the
procedure implies the existence of a system working to ensure fairness and
consistency, several problems arise in actual practice.
First and foremost, to ensure that a death sentence is proportionate to
penalties imposed in similar cases, the court must review cases where the
capitally-charged defendant received a life, not death, sentence. Presently,
the court uses capital cases that have appeared before it on appeal for pur-
poses of comparison.0" Naturally, most capital cases that result in a life
sentence are (1) not heard by the Supreme Court of Virginia since they are
appealed directly to the Virginia Court of Appeals and (2) in the event that
they are appealed to the supreme court, sentencing cannot be an issue
presented for review."° Thus, the statutory framework only ensures a
proportionality review among cases in which a death sentence was imposed.
In order to remedy this situation, the Supreme Court of Virginia must
collect, at a minimum, capitally-charged, life-sentenced cases heard before
the Virginia Court of Appeals. Absent review of such cases, the court can
only ascertain wether a death sentence has ever been imposed under similar
circumstances, not whether it is generally imposed under similar circum-
stances.
Another flaw in the procedure arises when the directive language of
section 17.1-313 is analyzed. The statutory language requires the court to
consider "such records as are available as a guide in determining whether the
sentence imposed in the case under review is excessive. Further, the cases
considered by the court "shall" be "made available" to the trial courts.6
However, the court is not explicitly given the responsibility to collect these
cases: "The Supreme Court may accumulate the records of all capital felony
101. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 1999).
102. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C)(2) (Michie 1999).
103. See Kelly E.P. Bennett, Proportionality Review: The Historical Application and
Deficiencies, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 103 (1999) (Part V this symposium).
104. See id.
105. S 17.1-313(E) (Michie 1999).
106. Id.
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cases tried within such period of time as the court may determine.""°7 The
result puts the burden on the shoulders of defense counsel to provide the
supreme court with cases comparable both factually and circumstantially
where a life sentence was imposed. Thus, the court does not truly ensure
proportionality. The General Assembly needs to clarify the "may"/"shall"
discrepancy and decisively direct the Supreme Court of Virginia to compile
an exhaustive database of capitally-charged cases for reference.
In daily practice, the supreme court does not, as is demanded by statute,'
distribute its records to the circuit courts. The fact that the statutory
language of section 17.1-313 requires this transmittal can only mean that trial
courts are, themselves, burdened with the duty of conducting a proportion-
ality review prior to the imposition of the death penalty.' To remedy
current practice and to ensure that this lower court review is conducted, the
Supreme Court of Virginia must (1) transmit the records of all capitally-
charged cases (including those obtained from the Virginia Court of Appeals)
to the circuit courts, (2) order trial courts to conduct proportionality review
within section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code,"° and (3) review circuit court
proportionality findings if the court imposes the jury-recommended death
sentence.
1/71. Twenty-One Day Rule
The rule that truly constrains the ability of an innocent death-sentenced
defendant to effectively contest his conviction is the "twenty-one day rule,"
Rule 3A:15 of the Virginia Rules of Supreme Court."' With advanced
DNA profiling, other technological developments, and, of course, exculpa-
tory testimony and evidence that surfaces post-trial, this rule limits a
defendant's right to prove his actual innocence. On January 21, 1998, and
January 21, 1999, bills were introduced to the Virginia General Assembly
to amend this rule by adding section 19.2-264.6 to the Virginia Code."'
These amendments proposed to allow a death-sentenced defendant to
present a "capital case bill of review" to the court that sentenced him to
death if (1) there is newly discovered evidence that "establishes a significant
probability" that the prisoner is actually innocent, (2) that evidence was not
known by defendant or trial counsel at time of trial, (3) the evidence is being
offered at the earliest time possible to the trial court, (4) the bill contains a
107. Id.
108. See Bennett, supra Part V this Symposium.
109. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1999) (outlining procedure for judicial
evaluation of post-sentence reports).
110. VA. R. SUP. CT. 3A:15(b) (codifying the inability of a trial court to set aside a guilty
jury verdict more than twenty-one days after entry of final order).
111. 1999 Va. H.B. 2298, 1999 Session; 1998 Va. H.B. 606, 1998 Session.
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"sufficient recitation" of the newly-discovered evidence, and (5) the bill is
filed no less than sixty days prior to the prisoner's scheduled execution.112
The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse strongly supports the adop-
tion of such a provision. Although the advent of technology has greatly
enhanced the possibility of valid actual-innocence claims, a defendant has no
right to reopen his case and prove his innocence. Particularly in light of
restricted access to federal habeas review after the passage of the Anti-terror-
ism and Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 113 Virginia should provide a forum
for claims of actual innocence through a mechanism such as proposed
section 19.2-264.6.
VIII. Conclusion
The Virginia legislature and judiciary possess the power and the re-
sources to remedy many of the existing problems with the practice of capital
law in Virginia. The problem areas have been defined and, while the sugges-
tions made are not exhaustive, it should be noted that the majority of the
remedies suggested herein do not require fundamental restructuring of the
Virginia capital murder statutes.
112. Id.
113. Pub. L. No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153).

